SOME NEW BOOKS.

New Views of the Great Persian War.

It may seem strange that the old story which has been recounted so lately and so well by Grote and Curtius, the story of the contest made immortal by Marathon and Thermopylæ, by Salamis and Platæa, should need to be retold, or would bear retelling. Yet this is the task which Mr. G. B. GRUNDY has undertaken in a large octavo volume of nearly 600 pages entitled *The Great Persian War and Its Preliminaries* (Scribners). The author, who is the university lecturer in classical geography at Oxford, recognizes in his preface that some explanation is needed of the attempt to furnish a new version of an old tale. He sees that such an experiment can only be justified in case a writer has become possessed of new evidence on the history of the period with which the story is concerned, or has reason to think that the treatment of preëxisting evidence has not been altogether satisfactory from a historical point of view. Mr. Grundy believes that the present work can be justified on both of these grounds, but especially on the first of them. The topographical evidence within reach of Curtius, Grote and their predecessors was imperfect. Up to ten years ago the only military site of first-rate importance in Greek history which had been surveyed was the Strait of Salamis. This the Hydrographic Department of the English Admiralty had included in the field of its activities. A chart of Pylos made by the same department was also available, but was quite inadequate for historical purposes. Since that time Marathon has been included in the survey of Attica, undertaken by the German staff officers for the German Archæological Institute and Mr. Grundy himself has made careful surveys of Thermopylæ, Platæa and Pylos at different times between 1892 and 1899. Pylos does not come within the scope of the present volume which deals with the Græco-Persian War, up to the end of 479 B. C. The author purposes to deal with the Hellenic warfare of the remainder of the fifth century B. C. in a separate volume.

Some of the conclusions here set forth are not in accord with the commonly accepted versions of the history of the period. Such a divergence will surprise no reader who recalls that in the absence of the surveys recently made the topographical side of Herodotean criticism was founded upon such sketches as Leake and other travellers had made of important historic sites and upon the verbal description of them contained in their works. Mr. Grundy does not underrate the value of the labors of such inquirers, but he believes that Leake would have been the last to claim any scientific accuracy for the sketch maps which he made, and he holds it to be self-evident that inaccurate maps cannot be used for the historical criticism of highly elaborate narratives. As to the trustworthiness of Herodotus's evidence, the results of investigation have convinced our author that this differs greatly, according as the historian is relating facts or is seeking to give the motives or causes lying behind them. The reasons for this conclusion are given at length in the course of the work. It is further pointed out that in his purely military history Herodotus is dealing with a subject about which he seems not to have possessed any special knowledge, and hardly any official information. The plan or design which lay behind the events which he relates can, therefore, only be arrived at in the majority of instances by means of an induction from the facts he mentions.

We shall here indicate as briefly as possible the view which his researches have led the author to take of the design and significance of the battle of Marathon, of the strategic plans conceived by the Persians in 480 B. C., of the battles of Thermopylæ and Salamis in that year and of the battle of Platæa in the following twelvemonth.

I.

In a chapter which sums up his conclusions Mr. Grundy submits that the great Persian War was a contest of a special type. In the majority of cases in which races and empires have come into collision each side has had some practical acquaintance with the resources, devices and fighting qualities of the other; in many cases, indeed, such experience has been intimate and prolonged. On the contrary, when the Persian and the European Greek came into collision in B. C. 480, such experience can hardly be said to have existed on either side. In so far as it did exist, it had been misleading. In only two instances had the European Greek come into contact with the Persian on the field of battle, and in both of them the same Greek State, the Athenian, had alone been represented in the conflict. At Ephesus, in the first year, (B. C. 499-498), of the Ionian revolt, a small contingent of Athenians had been present on the defeated side when the Persians fell on the expedition which had burnt Sardes. Manifestly a fight in which a small body of European Greeks had been defeated in partnership with hastily-raised levies of Ionians who had been long under Persian rule could not afford any trustworthy experience to either of the sides that were destined to take part in the war of twenty years later. The other instance was Marathon, a problem among battles. We shall see presently what Mr. Grundy has to say about this battle, but, meanwhile, note that from the absence of the Persian cavalry, it formed but an imperfect test of the fighting capacity and methods of Greek and Persian respectively.

Thus for all practical purposes, when the two races came into conflict, in B. C. 480, they were, militarily speaking, unknown quantities to one another, and each had to learn by experience how best to meet the strategy and tactics of the enemy. The consequence was inevitable. Both sides made grave mistakes of commission and omission; Mr. Grundy is even disposed to think that the victors made more mistakes than the vanquished, though not of such a fatal character. Relying on their prestige and their enormous numbers, the Persians seem to have held their adversaries too cheaply, and from this fundamental error all their other errors were generated. The extent of the change in the mental attitude of the Persians toward the Greek power after B. C. 479 is not, perhaps, appreciated, because the grounds of the confidence with which Persia entered upon the war are not sufficiently taken into consideration, the efforts made by Herodotus to bring this confidence into the foreground being commonly looked upon as aimed at the greater glorification of his own race. Mr. Grundy points out that the Persian's grounds for confidence are plain.

In a long and almost unbroken series of wars he had conquered western Asia. He had never met with a race which could face his own on a set field of battle, and this not in an experience of a few years, but in that of half a century. He was consequently justified in feeling that he had been tried in the balance of warfare and not found wanting. The success of other races against him had never been more than temporary. Nevertheless, the confidence was ill grounded for the following reasons: The Persian had never seen the Greek hoplite, or heavy-armed infantryman, at his best, well disciplined and fighing on ground suited to his tactics, save, perhaps, at Marathon, where the test was probably regarded as unconvincing, because the Persian's best arm, his cavalry, had not been present. Herodotus directs attention to the superiority of the hoplite's panoply over the defensive weapons of the comparatively light-armed Persian. The experience of all ages attests the truth that an army which possesses a notable superiority over its enemy with respect to weapons will, in all probability, if other things be equal, come off victorious. Such exceptions to this rule as history exhibits are rather apparent than real, and in the vast majority of cases are due to the fact that the possessor of the superior arms adopted tactics unsuited to them or wholly at variance with the nature of the region where the fighting was carried on. In the campaign of Platæa the Greek made a mistake of the latter kind, which was only annulled by a greater mistake made subsequently by his opponent. In the great Persian War, then, the two most efficient causes of the outcome were, first, the undue confidence of the Persian, giving rise to fatal mistakes, and, secondly, the great superiority of the Greek panoply. Our author is inclined to add a third cause of a negative character, to wit: The circumstance that the nature of the country would not permit of the invader making full use of his most formidable arm, the cavalry.

II.

In our author's opinion the circumstances preceding and attending the invasion of Greece in B. C. 480 prove that the military organization of the Persian Empire had attained a high state of efficiency. Upon this point Mr. Grundy observes: "Leaving out of consideration the difficulties to be overcome before the huge mixed force could be collected at Sardes (which town became for the time being, in place of Susa, the prime military base of the Empire), the organization which enabled this great army to be brought without accident, or, in so far as present knowledge goes, without a hitch of any kind, over the 800 miles of difficult country which separated its base from Middle Greece, must have been the outcome of a highly effective and highly elaborated system, evolved by a people whose experience was, indeed, large and long, but who must also have been gifted with that very high form of mental capacity which is able to carry out a great work of this nature. The secret of success—it may almost be said of possibility—in the present instance was the employment of the fleet for commisariat purposes. It was a method of advance not new to Persian campaigning, the first instance of its employment going back as far as the time of the invasion of Egypt by Cambyses."

Because our author describes the land force which Xerxes led into Greece as "huge" it is not to be inferred that he accepts the figures of Herodotus. Herodotus reckoned the land army at 1,700,000, and the total fighting effective of soldiers and sailors at 2,641,610. He says, however, that the number must be doubled in order to arrive at the full total of the expedition, including camp followers and the sailors employed on transports and victualling ships. By modern critics of the historian's narrative these figures are rejected as preposterous. Delbrück goes so far as to attribute to Xerxes an army of no more than 65,000 to 75,000 combatants. In that event Mardonius, who is represented by Herodotus as retaining for the Platæa campaign of the next year only a fraction of the barbarians serving under Xerxes, must, must even when reënforced by the Thessalians, Bœotians and other Medizing Greeks, have been outnumbered by the Greek force opposed to him under Pausanias.

The view of the numbers arrayed on the Persian side which is presented in the book before us is less reactionary. Mr. Grundy finds reasons for believing that the ordinary full levy of the Persian land forces produced an army of about half a million men. It had been called out for the Scythian expedition, which had been undertaken nearly twenty years before the invasion of Greece by Xerxes. This full levy however, was rarely made, and only when circumstances imperatively demanded it. On such occasions it was customary for the Great King to assume the command. Mr. Grundy hesitates to express any conjecture as to the possible maximum of the land force under Xerxes, but he concludes that the troops employed on land in the campaign of B. C. 480 somewhat exceeded the proportions of an ordinary full levy, or, in other words, amounted to rather more than half a million men. He deems it probable that Mardonius retained for the campaign of B. C. 479 a considerable part of the original land force, and that at Platæa, where he was supported by some fifty thousand Medizing Greeks he outnumbered in the proportion of at least two soldiers to one the Greek force, which, according to the statement of Herodotus, derived, apparently, from official information, amounted to a little over 108,000. Herodotus's assertion that the expedition took four years to prepare is pronounced exaggerated. The period of preparation is unlikely to have greatly exceeded three years, a period which was needed because depots of supplies had to be provided at convenient points along the proposed line of the long march; bridges had to be constructed across the Hellespont; and a canal had to be cut through the low and narrow isthmus which connects Mount Athos with the mainland of Chalkidike.

While Mr. Grundy rejects the figures of Herodotus with reference to the land army of Xerxes, he holds that there are no solid grounds for doubting the detailed statement of the historian concerning the Persian fleet. As that statement makes the number of war vessels 1,207, it follows that the levy on this occasion was just double the ordinary naval levy of 600 ships. To the total, 300 ships were contributed by the Phœnicians and Syrians; 200 by the Egyptians; 300 by non-Greek inhabitants of Asia Minor; and 407 by the conquered Greeks of Asia Minor, the Hellespontine region and the islands of the Ægean.

According to another statementof Herodotus, which Mr. Grundy does not dispute, the fleet of Xerxes included, besides the enumerated war vessels of the first class, thirty-oared and fifty-oared ships and transports to the number of 3,000. These figures represent the original size of the Persian fleet, and make no account of the losses suffered at Artemisium and elsewhere. Our author does not share the belief expressed by Herodotus that these losses had been made good by the time of the arrival of the Persian fleet at Salamis. As to the numbers of the Greek fleet at Salamis, varying estimates are given by Æschylus, who was an eye-witness of the battle, and by Herodotus, who wrote a good many years later. Nevertheless, Mr. Grundy accepts the computation of Herodotus, which gives the Greeks 366 triremes and seven fifty-oared vessels.

III.

What was the relative strength of the forces that had been opposed to each other at Marathon? Herodotus himself does not mention the size of the army mustered for the expedition under Datis and Artaphernes for the enslavement of Eretria and Athens. He says that the number of triremes in the fleet was 600, and that the men of the land army were embarked on board the vessels. In view of the smallness of the ships of those days and the largeness of the crews necessary to work the oars, Mr. Grundy deems it impossible to suppose that the average number of soldiers on board each vessel can have amounted to more than a hundred; he thinks that probably it was considerably less. The inference drawn is that the Persian force available for land operations was 60,000 at most, and may not have been more than 40,000. While Herodotus is silent on the subject, various exaggerated estimates of the numbers are given in later Greek historians. Modern authorities have formed estimates varying from 30,000 to 50,000. According to Herodotus, 6,400 Persians fell at Marathon, when the Persian centre must have been almost wiped out, but when not more than half the Persian army was engaged in the battle. This statement of the loss caused by the annihilation [of the centre would suggest 20,000 as the number of the Persians actually engaged at Marathon, and about 40,000 as the number of the whole expedition. Herodotus says that the Athenians and Platæans at Marathon numbered about 10,000 men.

Our author is inclined to regard this as an under-statement, though not one of a gross character. On the whole, he deems it highly improbable that the Persians taking part in the fight outnumbered the Greeks by two to one, and quite possible that the disproportion between the two armies was not very great. The battle at Marathon by no means planted in the Persian mind a conviction of Greek superiority in land warfare, for the reason, as we have said, that the strongest Persian arm, the cavalry, had not been represented in the action; having been reëmbarked in that part of the fleet which had been detached for the purpose of making a dash upon Athens during the absence of its defenders. There is no doubt that Marathon, owing largely to Athenian exaggeration of the facts, made a great and immediate impression upon contemporary Greeks. It raised the military reputation of Athens, which, previously, had been mediocre, to a great height. Our author, however, is clearly of the opinion that Sir Edward Creasy was not justified in preferring Marathon to Salamis as one of the "fifteen decisive battles of the world." The decisive battles exemplified in Creasy's book are in nearly every case the outcome of a chain of events extending in many instances over a series of preceding years. If the first link in the chain is to be regarded as decisive of the whole series of subsequent events, then, perhaps, the choice of Marathon may be justified; but on the same principle of choice the decisive battles of the world would in many cases have to be sought for in comparatively obscure engagements. If, as is the case with most of the instances adduced by Sir Edward Creasy, the supreme decisive moment in a great situation is to be taken, then Salamis, not Marathon, is to be chosen in the great Persian War of the first quarter of the fifth century B. C. The actual record of the years immediately following the victory gained by Miltiades fails to support the view that from Marathon onward the tide of the struggle with Persia flowed uninterruptedly in favor of the Greeks.

Mr. Grundy suggests that it was not, perhaps, until the war was over that the Greeks themselves acquired sufficient perspective to gauge aright the full significance of their triumph in the sea fight at Salamis. That victory absolutely destroyed the very foundation of the great strategical plan on which the invasion of Greece had been conducted, namely, the combined action of the Persian fleet and army. Never, perhaps, has the influence of sea power been more strikingly exemplified in warfare than in the total reversal of circumstances which resulted from Salamis. For many years before that engagement the naval power of Persia had been supreme in the Ægean and eastern Mediterranean; but from Salamis onward, the decline was rapid and the Persian navy was never again, as an unaided unit, formidable in the Ægean. From this point of view, Mr. Grundy would compare Salamis with Lepanto, but the comparison does injustice to the Turks. Within a very short time after their defeat at the hands of Don John of Austria, the Turks had constructed new naval armaments on a colossal scale, and had recovered ascendancy in the Mediterranean. In no just sense of the word can Lepanto be described as one of the decisive battles of the world. Salamis, on the contrary, not only shaped the naval relations of Greece to Persia for 150 years, but it was decisive of the particular war in which it was fought. Having lost the command of the sea, the Persians could not possibly maintain in a poor country like Greece the overwhelming land force with which they had invaded it. The mere question of supplies rendered the rapid withdrawal of the major part of it an imperative necessity. Persia did not, indeed, give up the struggle, but she was obliged to continue it with a force so reduced in numbers that the Greeks were able to match it in fighting strength, if not in actual numerical strength. Salamis was the turning point of the war. Platæa was but the consummation of Salamis. After Salamis, southern Greece was safe. Mardonius might have maintained himself for some time in the rich lands of Bœotia, and might even have attempted to include that region definitely within the Persian frontier, but he could not have carried on a sustained campaign in the poverty-stricken district south of the Bœotian border.

IV.

In the chapter on the campaign of Platæa our author shows that the Persians, who outnumbered the Greeks in the proportion of about two to one, were successful up to the final engagement, when their defeat was due to a fatal mistake upon their own part. From the moment that Mardonius took up the defensive in Bœotia, it was possible for the Persians to choose ground favorable to the nature of their force, which was vastly superior in cavalry, but included no troops capable of coping in close fight with the hoplites, or heavy-armed infantry, of the Greeks. The resultant difference between the two armies was that the Greek had everything to hope for from close fighting; the Persian everything from the opposite. In every case, not only at Platæa, but throughout the war, in which reverse or disaster fell on either party, it was due to its having been forced, either by the nature of the position, or by some tactical error of its own, into adopting the method of combat for which it was least adapted. In the campaign of Platæa, indeed, there were mistakes on both sides. While the Greeks were in their first position, the Persian threw away his excellent cavalry in an attack on a necessarily limited portion of the front of the Greek heavy infantry, where outflanking was impossible, and only close fighting could be effective. A repulse was inevitable. In their second position the Greeks made the mistake of seeking to maintain an advanced place in the plain, after the object with which they had, in all probability, occupied the place, to wit, a surprise flank attack on the Persians, had proved unattainable. In view of the excessive immobility of their army, as compared with that of the enemy, the danger that their line of communication with the passes in their rear, short though the line was, might be cut, was evident, and their position permitted the Persian cavalry to harass them on all sides by that form of attack to which it was best adapted.

The mistake cost the Greeks dearly, and ought to have cost them the battle. On the retirement of the Greeks from this position, however, Mardonius threw away the success he had gained by hurling his light-armed infantry against the large Spartan contingent of hoplites. By doing so he threw away all the advantage which he possessed by reason of his mobile force of cavalry. The Spartan commander, Pausanias, held his men back despite a galling shower of missiles, until, as it would seem, the foremost ranks of the enemy were deprived of all power of retreating by the pressure of the ranks in their rear. Then he charged; and in the close fighting which ensued, the Persian had no chance, despite the conspicuous bravery in which he seems never to have been lacking.

The view which is taken of the defence of Thermopylæ in the book before us differs materially from that set forth in most histories of Greece. If we accept the figures given by Herodotus, and leave out of calculation the number of the Opuntian Locrians, which he does not give, but add the light-armed soldiers, which would be present with the three hundred Spartan hoplites, we arrive at a total of 7,300 for the defenders of the pass. Mr. Grundy, who has made a careful survey of Thermopylæ itself, and who has personally walked over the Anopæan mountain path by which the position of Leonidas was turned, considers that the force was ample for the defence of the pass, had the 1,000 Phocians who had been expressly detailed to guard the Anopæan path, done their duty. That is recognized by many historians; where our author differs from most is in the belief that, even after the Phocians were known to have failed to guard the path, there was still time to stop the Persians debouching there from in the rear of the main Greek force, and that to this duty Leonidas deputed the 2,800 soldiers who, according to Herodotus, either deserted him or were dismissed. The motive assigned by Herodotus for the determination of Leonidas to remain personally at the pass is rejected in the book before us.

According to the Greek historian, the Pythian oracle had announced to Sparta quite early in the war that either Sparta would be destroyed by the barbarians, or its King would perish. Mr. Grundy is far from denying that a great act of self-abnegation on the part of Leonidas is conceivable, but he submits that the 700 Thespians who voluntarily remained with him could have had no wish to save Sparta at their own expense, especially as they must have held the Spartan State guilty of flagrant treachery in failing to keep its promise to reënforce the defenders of the pass. Moreover, while it would have been noble for Leonidas to court death in his own person, if thereby he might save his city, it would have been disgraceful for him to allow 700 devoted men of a little Bœotian city to share a doom which, according to the oracle, he alone needed to incur.

In our author's opinion Leonidas "died a nobler death than that." It was through no superstitious belief in the oracle reported by Herodotus, "but with the grander courage of reason that he faced the terrible odds against him on the last day of his life." He had time for retreating after his scouts had made the enemy's flanking movement known to him. He was under no compulsion, moral or material, to remain. It is not true that Spartan discipline at the time forbade a commander under any circumstances to withdraw from a position once taken up. Artemisium, and, above all, Platæa, prove this not to have been the case. Why, then, did not Leonidas withdraw after he learned that the Persians were turning his position by the Anopæan path? Because "there was just the possibility that, by detaching about half his force to stop the encircling body of the foe in the difficult path which they were traversing, he might still be able to maintain the pass, and, if he did maintain it, he would do his country an inestimable service. It was thus that with half his little army he deliberately chose to face an enemy one hundred times his own numerical strength. He took a risk of whose magnitude he must have been well aware, to win, in case of success, a prize of incalculable greatness." If this be the right interpretation of the course pursued by Leonidas, it cannot be said that the nobility of his death was marred by a useless sacrifice of the lives of devoted men.

"Great as was the risk, the greatness of the end to be attained in case of success justified his associating others with himself in the desperate venture." Mr. Grundy can testify from personal observation of the ground that there was a possibility of defending the pass, even after a picked body of Persians had forced their way along the Anopæan path. The possibility may have been remote; but it existed. As a matter of fact, however, that moiety of his force which Leonidas is here assumed to have detached in order to meet the Persians as they emerged from the path were too cowardly to discharge their duty, but fled southward. Thenceforward, it would be to their interest to conceal the facts, and this they could do the more easily because he who could affirm the truth with absolute authority had died in the incomparable battle.

V.

The account here given of the Battle of Salamis is very largely, though not exclusively based on the view advocated by Prof. W. W. Goodwin of Harvard University in an article on "Salamis," which was published in the Journal of the *Archæological Institute of America*, 1882-83. As the main basis of his argument, Prof. Goodwin propounded the necessity of taking into serious consideration the evidence given in the Persæ by Æschylus, who was an eye-witness of the great naval battle. Mr. Goodwin, indeed, laid it down that the evidence of Æschylus, in so far as it was plainly drawn from personal observation, must be regarded as superior in authority to any evidence on the same point contained in other extant descriptions of the fight. Mr Grundy thinks that in so doing Prof. Goodwin rendered a most important service to the study of a memorable crisis in the ancient world, and he expresses surprise that the various histories of Greece which are either new or have been reëdited since Mr. Goodwin's article was published, should not have materially modified their scheme of the battle of Salamis in accordance with his views.

It is generally agreed—in fact the evidence is unanimous on this point—that the Persians drew up their fleet in some way so as to block the eastern end of the Salamis Strait. The way in which they did this, however, is disputed. The main points in dispute are these: First, as to the locality of the part of the other or western end of the Strait which they also blocked so as to prevent the Greek fleet from escaping, viz.: whether it was the narrow portion of the eastern Strait, at the point where it enters the Bay of Eleusis, or whether it was the strait between Salamis Island and the Megarid coast; secondly, as to the position of the Persian fleet, especially at daybreak on the morning of the battle. With regard to the second point it should be borne in mind that the scheme of the battle given in nearly all the modern histories of Greece represents the Persian fleet as drawn up on the morning of the battle along the Attic coast from the narrows at the entrance of the Bay of Eleusis almost to the mouth of Piræus harbor, while the Greek fleet is opposite, extending from a point some way north of the island of St. George almost to the end of the Kynosura Peninsula. The arguments against the old scheme put forward by Mr. Goodwin are based upon the uncontroverted fact that the passage between Attica and the island of Psyttaleia is 1,300 yards wide; that between Mount Ægaleos on the main land and the island of Salamis, 1,500 yards, and that between Ægaleos and St. George Island, 1,200 yards. In a word, the whole channel in which the battle was fought was very narrow. Now, if, as the advocates of the old scheme assert, the Persian and Greek fleets lay opposite one another in this narrow channel on the night before the battle, how, asks Prof. Goodwin, could the Persian movement to cut off their opponents from the means of retreat by sending a detachment to the western end of the strait be accomplished so secretly that the Greeks got no wind of it? How could the Persians have slipped along their side of the narrow strait in the night unperceived?

In the second place, can we believe that the Greek fleet was allowed in the morning to form quietly in line of battle on its side of this narrow strait in the very face of the Persian fleet, only a few hundred yards distant? Surely the Persian fleet, being eager to capture the Greek fleet, would have seized the ships while the crews were preparing to embark. In the third place, Æschylus, an eyewitness, testifies that it was only after the Greeks had rowed forward from their position that they were fairly seen by the Persians. It is also to be noted that Æschylus and other authorities concur in the statement that Xerxes landed a body of Persians on the island of Psyttaleia, because he thought that it would be a central point of the sea fight. It would have been absurd to land troops on Psyttaleia, if the fleets had been drawn up on the morning of the battle according to the scheme adopted by Grote and almost all the modern historians of Greece. Such are Prof. Goodwin's objections to the old scheme, and to Mr. Grundy they seem unanswerable. "As I read the narrative," he says, "the old scheme of Grote and others cannot stand in face of them." According to the view advocated in the book before us, the Persian fleet on the morning of the battle was drawn up in three semi-circular lines, stretching from the Piræus to the promotory of Kynosura, and just south of the island of Psyttaleia. On the other hand, the original position of the Greek fleet on the morning of the battle was between the town of Salamis and the temple of Heracles on Mount Ægaleos. In other words, the two fleets in their original position on the morning of the battle were almost out of sight of one another, and, as Æschylus says, the Greeks could not be fairly seen by the Persians until they had rowed forward.

The author of this book recognizes that the blunder which led Xerxes to attack the Greeks at Salamis was fatal, alike tactically and strategically. He had the game in his own hands, if he could only have discerned the fact; but, in his confidence, of success with the vastly preponderant forces at his disposal, he wished not only to outmanœuvre but to cauture the whole Greek fleet. The results of Salamis were immediate. The defeat and moral disorganization of the Persian fleet made it incapable of maintaining its position on the west side of the Ægean, though, in point of material damage it probably had not suffered more severely proportionately to numbers than had the fleet which had been opposed to it. Its departure withdrew, as it were, the keystone of the Persian plan of invasion, and the whole edifice of the original design fell into irreparable ruin, though the wreck was not so complete as to render it impossible for Mardonius to make use of a part of the materials in the ensuing year. The blow had fallen on the indispensable half of the invading force; and, bereft of the aid of the fleet, the land army could no longer maintain itself in a country the natural resources of which were wholly inadequate to supply its wants.

VI.

The precise date within the year 480 B. C. on which the Sicilian Greeks won their tremendous victory over the Carthaginians at Himera is uncertain. There was a tradition that the battle was fought on the same day as Salamis, but as the historians of the period display a marked tendency to discover such coincidences no statement of the kind can be regarded as trustworthy. To the importance of the victory at Himera our author is keenly alive. The contemporary Greek on the shores and islands of the Ægean sought to ignore or minimize its significance; his posterity but half remembered it, and Herodotus accepted the maimed tradition as he found it. Mr. Grundy holds, however, that to the historical inquirer of the present day, who has all the evidence before him, the episode in the Persian War, which culminated at Himera, must appear not the least glorious part of the great struggle which saved Western civilization.

The satisfactorily attested fact that a large Carthaginian army, incomparably better adapted for close fighting than was the Persian, attacked Sicily almost simultaneously with the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, raises, of course, the question whether the coincidence or proximity in time between the two attacks was anything more than accidental. It has been inferred from the silence of Herodotus on the point that the coincidence was fortuitous. Diodorous, however, asserts that Xerxes sent an embassy to the Carthaginians informing them that he was himself about to attack the Greeks inhabiting Hellas proper, and directing them to attack simultaneously the Greeks in Sicily and Italy. The assertion is confirmed by a fragment of Ephorus's history which says that envoys from the Persians and Phœnicians went to the Carthaginians, and urged them to assail Sicily. In view of the silence of Herodotus, our author would not maintain that the proof of a concerted plan of invasion is absolutely conclusive. He proceeds to test it by the law of probability. From this point of view stress is laid upon the fact that Phœnicia, the mother country of Carthage, was at the time included within the Persian dominion. Its population seems on the whole to have received exceptionally favorable treatment from the Persian Government, probably because it supplied the best material, animate and inanimate, to the fleet of the empire. It would obviously be to the interest of the Persian Government to encourage the most enterprising traders under its sway. It is further to be observed that the subjugation of Phœnicia had not broken the tie of relationship between the mother country and the greatest of its colonies. When, under Cambyses, the Persian dominions had been extended as far as the Greater Syrtis, the Phœnicians had refused to go any further, and prosecute a war against their kin. It had apparently been thought wise, if not necessary, to acquiesce in their refusal. From that time forward there had been no unfriendly relations, so far as is known, between Persia and Carthage. So long as the Phœnician was well treated by his suzerain at Susa, there was hardly a point on which the Persian and Carthaginian empires could clash. In the present instance, their interests manifestly coincided.

It was certainly to the interest of Xerxes that the Sicilian Greeks should have their hands full at the time of his great invasion of Greece. The Persians had plenty of means of knowing that there was a great Greek military power in Sicily which might render important aid to the continental Greeks in the coming struggle. The Carthaginian, on the other hand, might well think the invasion of the Greek mainland by Xerxes a favorable opportunity for crushing the ever-increasing Greek trade competition in the richest island in the Mediterranean, for at such a time the Sicilian Greek could expect no help from the mother country. On the whole, when he considers the part played by the Phœnicians in Xerxes's expedition, Mr. Grundy deems it far more probable that there was a connection between the two expeditions than that there was not.

M. W. H.

The French and Indian War.

It is, perhaps, a sign of the times that an Englishman should have written, and the British publishing house of Archibald, Constable & Co. should have printed, the large octavo volume of nearly four hundred pages entitled *The Fight With France for North America*. American readers have supposed that the subject was dealt with once for all by Francis Parkman, but the author of the book before us, Mr. A. G. BRADLEY, tells us that Parkman's narratives are known to a comparatively small number of Englishmen. Why, then, should it be assumed that the subject would excite more general interest in England to-day than it has during the last quarter of a century? The reason given in the preface is that the fight with France for North America, which is supposed to have culminated on the Plains of Abraham in 1759, presents an instructive parallel to the struggle for racial supremacy which is now going on in South Africa. Evidently, Mr. Bradley thinks that the course which was pursued by the British in Canada, during the war which ended in 1763, justifies the South African policy of the Salisbury Government. It will be remembered that England, by the Peace of Paris, obtained the unconditional surrender of the French possessions in North America east of the Mississippi River, but that, having thus acquired unqualified sovereignty in that region, she treated the French inhabitants with generosity then unprecedented. Indeed, the privileges conceded to them by the Quebec Act of 1774 gave great offence to the Protestant natives of the thirteen British colonies which were presently to assert their independence.

The present volume is strictly confined to a narration of those episodes of the Seven Years' War which took place on the mainland of North America. With the vicissitudes of the struggle between England and France on the Continent of Europe or in India, or on the ocean, in the Mediterranean Sea and the British Channel, the author does not concern himself. Even the operations in the West Indies are passed over, only two lines being devoted to the capture of Havana, to which American colonists greatly contributed. Neither is any attention paid to those collisions of the French and English on the American mainland which preceded the outbreak of the French and Indian War. The remarkable capture of Louisbourg by Colonial troops, for instance, receives only a cursory allusion. Indeed, it must be observed that throughout his narrative the author renders but scant justice to the part played by the American colonists in the struggle against the French. The truth is that the New England colonies and New York were lavish in their sacrifice of men and money. The resentment with which, later, the Stamp Act was regarded was largely due to the remembrance of efforts which had brought the colonies to the verge of bankruptcy.

To those English readers who have not seen, and are unlikely to see, Mr. Parkman's volumes, Mr. Bradley's book offers a succinct, reasonable and fairly accurate account of the memorable contest which put an end to the French hopes of acquiring an empire in North America. Distinctly creditable to the author is the brief preliminary sketch of the social and industrial conditions of the thirteen British colonies on the one hand and of the French settlements on their northern and western frontier about the beginning of the sixth decade of the eighteen century. He reminds us that, as regards population, there was an immense discrepancy between the combatants. On the other hand, the French in Canada, exclusive of some ten thousand Acadians, who were nominally British subjects, numbered about sixty thousand souls. On the other hand, the colonial subjects of Great Britain in North America were reckoned by the middle of the eighteenth century at nearly a million and a half.

The French strength in Canada, however, such as it was, was concentrated and wielded by an autocratic government, whereas the British provinces were so self-absorbed and isolated from one another as to be disqualified for effective combination. In the French and Indian War the three southern colonies, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia, bore no noticeable part. How sluggish and inefficient was the action of Virginia, the letters of Washington, who commanded on the frontier of that colony, attest. The British Government and the northern colonies had continual reason to complain of the selfish course pursued by Pennsylvania. It was, indeed, as we have said, the New England colonies and New York that bore the brunt of the conflict.

Mr. Bradley's treatment of some incidents in the French and Indian War deserves particular commendation. We refer to his account of Braddock's defeat near Fort Duquesne, and to his refusal to slur over the British defeat in the second battle on the plains of Abraham which occurred in the year following Wolfe's victory. Of the unfortunate British commander in the battle near Fort Duquesne our author truly says: "No name has been more irresponsibly played upon, and few reputations, perhaps, have been more hardly used, than Braddock's, by most writers of history and nearly all writers of fiction. His personality, from its very contrast to the wild woods in which he died, has caught the fancy of innumerable pens and justice has been sadly sacrificed to picturesque effect. One is almost inclined to think that the mere fact of his name beginning with a letter which encourages a multiplication of strenuous epithets, has been against him. By all American writers he is depicted as the typical redcoat of the Hanoverian period—burly, brutal, blundering, blasphemous, but happily always and without a dissentient note—brave, brave indeed, as a lion. This familiar picture of our poor General, as a corpulent, red-faced, blaspheming bull dog, riding roughshod over colonial susceptibilities, tones down amazingly when one comes to hard facts." Mr. Bradley goes on to show that what is really known about Braddock is in his favor. Vanquished in a duel, he had been too proud to ask his life.

When in command at Gibraltar he was "adored by his men," and this, though he was notorious as a strict disciplinarian, a quality which Wolfe at that very time was declaring to be the most badly needed one in the British Army. The simple truth about Braddock is that he was the first British General to conduct a considerable campaign in a remote wilderness. He had no precedents furnished by the experience of others to guide him, and he found little help in the colonies, where he had been taught to look for much. He has been accused of disparaging the Colonial irregulars and of neglecting to utilize friendly Indians. As to the first taunt, Mr. Bradley submits that, in view of the appearance and discipline of the provincial troops that were paraded before Braddock, he would not as a soldier trained on European fields have been human had he refrained entirely from open criticism. As to the second taunt, the facts brought forward in this book demonstrate that it has no foundation. Robert Orme of the Thirty-fifth Regiment, who was one of the General's aide-de-camps and who himself was highly thought of by the provincials, gives no hint in his diary that Braddock was the violent, unreasonable, foul-mouthed person who has since figured in magazine articles. Orme was as much disheartened as his chief by the appearance and seeming temper of the Colonial troops and dwells on the trying conditions which Braddock had to meet, and the energy and honesty with which he endeavored to do his duty. It is certain that Braddock quickly appreciated Washington, and to save the Virginia Colonel from the indignity of ranking under a British ensign placed him on his personal staff. Braddock appreciated Benjamin Franklin also, and in a despatch to his Government described him as the "first capable and sensible man I have met in the country." Mr. Bradley contends that in no proper sense of the word can Braddock be said to have been surprised at Fort Duquesne. Throughout the march thither, on the contrary, admirable discipline was maintained, and every precaution that prudence required was observed. When the attack upon him was ultimately made it succeeded simply because Braddock's soldiers were not backwoodsmen.

It is with some indignation that the author of this book points out that "even the dying moments of the gallant bulldog have been made the theme of much fanciful dialogue, and garnished with fictitious utterances of grief at the disaster and remorse for his supposed obstinacy and rashness. That he twice tried to arrest the stampede, and then took measures for the comfort of the wounded is all that we know for certain of his last hours." It is not, of course, here pretended that Braddock was a great General. The plain truth is that he was sent to carry out an undertaking arduous and unprecedented in British experience, and did his best in the face of immense difficulties, human and physical. Both he and his soldiers had, perhaps, grown a little too confident after crossing the second ford of the Monongahela. Till then, however, he had been entirely successful in avoiding ambuscades, and even the scene of the final engagement was no ambush in the ordinary sense of the term. Had his scouts been pushed farther foward, he would have been notified, no doubt, a little earlier of the impending attack; but under no circumstances would his regulars have been qualified to face even a lesser number of Indians in their native woods. Of provincial combatants on the field of battle, there were not 200 on the British side, and many of these had had no backwoods experience whatever.

The author of this book is right in saying that not a few popular historians assume that the fate of Canada was settled by Wolfe's victory on the Plains of Abraham. That battle was fought on the 13th of September 1759, and was followed by the surrender of Quebec. Very little attention is paid to the fact that on the 28th of April, 1760, a second battle was fought on the Plains of Abraham; that it resulted in a victory for the French; and that the city must have been surrendered by the British if the arrival of their fleet in the St. Lawrence had been somewhat retarded, or if a French fleet had preceded it. Had the French recovered Quebec in 1760, it is probable that, no matter what successes might have been subsequently gained by Amherst further up the river, they would have kept Canada at the Peace of Paris. As it was, the question was mooted in England whether it would not be expedient to give back Canada to the French, receiving in exchange the rich sugar-producing island of Guadeloupe. There were not wanting far-sighted men in London at the time who argued that, so long as Canada should remain in French hands, it would constitute a guarantee of the loyalty of the thirteen British colonies, but that, once relieved from the apprehension of invasion from the north, the colonies might rebel against the mother country. The event justified the forecast. It is perfectly true that the bugles which acclaimed Wolfe's victory on the Plains of Abraham sounded not only the death knell of the French Empire in the New World, but also the birth note of the great American Republic.

With regard to an incident of the French and Indian War which has provoked a great deal of discussion—the deportation of the French *habitans* from Acadia in 1755—Mr. Bradley declines to say whether or no the radical operation was justifiable. He leaves the reader to pass his own judgment on it. At the same time, it is pointed out that no hint comes down from any contemporary source of information that, under the circumstances, there was any alternative. At the time, there seems, indeed, to have been but one opinion as to the necessity of the deportation. Our author also submits that it would be well to remember "that the year was not 1900, but 1755; that the perpetrators of the deed, colonists and British officials, were confronted with what proved one of the most pregnant struggles in modern history, and were ill-equipped for it; that they had previously treated the Acadians with a consistent indulgence that had then no parallel under such circumstances; that the lives and fortunes of 4,000 peaceful English settlers on the Halifax side of the province were in daily jeopardy; and, lastly, that a considerable number of the exiles themselves had their hands red with the blood of Englishmen, not killed in fair fight, but murdered in Indian fashion while peacefully pursuing their daily avocations on British soil." While Mr. Bradley, however, thus skilfully puts forward pleas in abatement of the odium, in which the authors of the deportation are now generally held, one can see, that he has no hope of appealing successfully from the verdict pronounced by both English and American readers of "Evangeline." If a picturesque lie can never be overtaken by a homely truth, what likelihood is there that a poet can be supplanted by an historian?